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1 The issue
The issue Tindale is addressing is what a theory of evaluation should include; specifically
whether our theories should include both truth and acceptability, or only acceptability. It would
seem that Tindale belongs to the latter category and I certainly belong to the former. Tindale’s
opposition to the truth criterion (TC) seems to stem from two sources: first, from a disinclination
to want to see argumentation as about Truth (absolute, objective truth), as he makes clear in his
(1999); second, the difficulty in applying the criterion is a meaningful way in argument
evaluation. These reasons he combines with a belief that the acceptability criterion (AC) will
give us everything needed for argument evaluation, without the excess baggage.

2 Tindale’s argument
In this paper Tindale criticizes my position on truth (both 1998 and 2000) in a number of
ways but these generally focuses on two theses:
T1 The truth-criterion (TC) is vague (confused) and problematic (not well justified).
T2 The acceptability criterion (AC ) is perfectly adequate.
Most of the paper is directed to supporting T1. The business about the orangutans stems
from Hamblin’s argument that alethic criteria are inadequate because truth is neither necessary
nor sufficient for premise adequacy. Tindale concedes my point that the example is not well
suited but argues that Hamblin has provided another (the Martian canals ) that makes the same
point. (I don’t like this example any better, as will become clear later.) Tindale further defends
Hamblin’s critique of truth (3) by continuing the critique of correspondence theories of truth that
he (Tindale) believes are problematic. He also counters what he considers my strongest argument
(4) for the TC (i.e., that its debunkers continue to use it). In the next section (4) he discusses
further problems with correspondence theories (reciting the familiar objections) concluding that
correspondence theories won’t work. He then takes up Goldman’s approach (6), which he thinks
may yet be subject to Hamblin’s God’s eye criticism. In the last section of his paper he turns to
a defense of T2 (7 ff). The argument there is to the effect that I have not raised any objections to
acceptability, and he argues that whatever need there might be for a truth criterion can be handled
by acceptability; the truth criterion is unnecessary.
Tindale is pressing me, and rightly so, on an area where I admit my position is not welldeveloped. (It is not vague, though possibly confused.) I hold that an adequate theory of
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evaluation must include both a truth criterion and an acceptability criterion. In (2000), I did not
provide an account of either; rather I attempted to flesh out the conditions that that such an
account would have to satisfy. I did not present an account of truth but rather indexed the
properties I believed an adequate account of truth would have to include to that degree, my
position is not well developed. There was also some ground of confusion with respect to what I
said there about correspondence theories and Tindale has questioned that. Fair enough. I made an
attempt to solve the IP but I can see now that this was quite possibly premature. I should not have
attempted a solution until I had worked out issues with regard to TC. Moreover in 1998 I
attempted to defend the TC by showing that those who debunk it are nevertheless committed to
it--a theme I return to shortly. Tindale thinks TC is redundant, whereas I think it is necessary.

3 Some dialectical matters
Looking at the situation from my vantage point on the dialectical tier, let me say that
while in the main Tindale has given an accurate account of my position, there are aspects of my
view that I believe Tindale slightly misunderstands, and there are others aspects of my view
which I believe he has ignored.
As to the former: Tindale says that my solution to The Integration Problem is that
informal logic should adopt the truth requirement, while rhetoric will adopt acceptability. He
cites page 271 but I think a careful reading shows that that is not quite my view. My view is that
informal logic should adopt both; that is what gives rise to the problem I then inherit of how to
integrate them. I think I should not attempt to speak for rhetoric (I expect rhetoricians will be just
about as divided on this as logicians; some eschew truth; others do not (as Jean Goodwin has
reminded me) except to point out that I do not hold rhetoric accountable for the problems here. I
lay the blame at the feet of Hamblin.
I do not take the view that the truth requirement is “more rational” than the acceptability
but rather argue that it fits better with the requirement of manifest rationality. It may well be that
my argument is not good enough but that is what I aimed to show.
Finally, the view he attributes to me about how truth is used in argument evaluation
(pp.8) is not my view at all. I return to this later.

4 The truth criterion
In this response, I will argue that while there are problems with the truth criterion these
problems are not sufficient reason for discarding it, since it continues to operate behind the
scenes (reprising my 1998 thesis), and as we heard in the paper just presented not just behind the
scenes but right on stage. The criterion cannot be as vague as he complains, because Tindale
himself appears to be in favour of some form of the truth requirement (both in this paper and in
1999). Further I continue to argue that Hamblin’s critique of truth which seems to lie at the core
of his rejection and which so many have found persuasive is not effective because Hamblin, too,
is committed to the truth criterion.
The 1998 objection. Tindale refers to my objection of 1998 as my strongest argument.
That argument is that theorists who officially discharge the truth-requirement continue to depend
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on it in their theorizing (1998, 2000). His response is that even if they continue to use it, their
use of it does not commit them to its being necessary, nor yet does it explain how it is being
used.
As to the first point: if it is not necessary, then what is its status? My view again is that
truth is neither a necessary condition for premise adequacy, nor yet a sufficient condition (p.
680). As to the second point: it may be that theorists use truth without explaining how it is
being used. Whether or not that is serious depends on how central a role it has in their theory. I
certainly take truth to be a normative standard: it is good thing to have true premises. Possibly
there are ways of handling TC that do not commit the user to a normative standard; and possibly
the authors I mentioned in (1998) do not have this use in mind, though I suspect they do. But
Tindale is not in their company. Let me quote a text where he gets into some trouble. At this
point Tindale is arguing that everything I want from TC can be gotten from AC. He has
presented on my behalf a coherence account of truth (which he attributes to James, but which is
not quite James’s view). Tindale writes:
a premise is false because it does not cohere with the others in the system. Put another
way, an arguer should not advance it and an audience would not be justified were they to
accept it. But the acceptability requirement is sufficient to do this work. The premise is
unacceptable because it expresses a belief that is inconsistent with other relevant beliefs
that are acceptable (8).
My question is: How are you going to unpack inconsistency? Doesn’t inconsistency
require some reference to two propositional contents that cannot be true together? And how are
you going to unpack relevance without invoking truth? Can relevance be analyzed in terms of
acceptability? I think these questions need answering.
Hamblin’s examples. Tindale concedes that Hamblin’s orangutan example, about which I
wrote in MR, is perhaps unfortunate; a “bad choice” but he believes the point Hamblin intends
remains valid and switches attention to another of Hamblin’s examples (pp. 3) the one about
Martian canals. I am sorry that I have to say I don’t like this example any better.
The argument Hamblin offers us goes like this:
Martian canals are not man-made, because there has never been organic life on Mars.
Here is Tindale’s take on the premise:
Here the premise is not obviously unacceptable; rather it is questionable, if we imagine a
general audience of intelligent people. That is, while an intelligible premise to us we
have neither the grounds to accept it nor the grounds to reject it. It remains questionable
for us (and in a weaker sense, cannot be accepted), until the arguer assumes the burden of
proof to provide support and succeeds or fails in that effort. If he fails we will not accept
the premise. We reject it not because it is false, but because it fails to be a reason for is to
accept the conclusion that the canals are not man-made (3).
As Tindale suspects, I do have some sympathy for this assessment. I would flag the
argument because the arguer has filed to provide any support for the premise; not because the
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premise is false but because it is not acceptable. Tindale says: “But this should lead us to ask
when this is not the case. That is, in what case do we have truth as the primary criterion?” A
reasonable question, though not an argument against having a truth criterion; it is a rather a
question of when and how to apply it. In any event, here is one illustration: the argument just
given about canals on Mars. Possibly the conclusion dealt with an issue that was disputed when
Hamblin wrote this (in the mid60s). But the main problem with the argument is not the
acceptability of the premise; it is that the conclusion presupposes something (that there are canals
on Mars) that is false. http://ltpwww.gsfc.nasa.gov/tharsis/canals.html

Hamblin’s God’s-eye View Objection Revisited
As to the God’s eye view argument which Tindale takes up next. This has always seemed
to me yet another unconvincing argument offered by Hamblin. Why does it follow that someone
who adopt a truth requirement must adopts God’s-eye view. What is a God’s-eye view? I think
the idea behind this argument is that a certain notion of truth may be said to presuppose
omniscience. What view of truth? The traditional view conceives truth as absolute, an objective
relationship between facts and statements. Truth is what God knows. However, this view is a
remnant of a bygone day in which it was assumed that human knowledge imitated divine
knowledge. But, the argument would run, we have long since abandoned such views of
knowledge and truth. This view has merit. It runs through the fabric of the pragmatist attempt to
redefine knowledge and inquiry. Even here, it is important to point out that neither Peirce nor
Dewey though they abandoned certain views about knowledge and belief---Cartesian ones) ever
abandoned truth as a standard, nor did they abandon the view that truth is a relationship between
proposition and the world.
Moreover, Hamblin seems to think that logicians who advocate truth as criterion abandon
their position as participants in the dialogue and assume this omniscient view. I think the point
Hamblin is making is not so much about being omniscient but about taking a vantage point
outside the argument and making pronouncements upon it (as a God might do). But, as I argued
(2000:188), this objection seems to involve a misreading of what the logician is up to. The
logician’s task is not to offer an evaluation of any particular argument by deploying the truth
criterion; rather it is to set forth conditions under which an argument is good or not. Hamblin
says: “But consider now the position of the onlooker and particularly that of the logicians who is
interested in analyzing and perhaps passing judgement on what transpires” (244). The logician
does not stand above an outside practical argumentation or, necessarily, pass judgement on it; he
is not a judge or court of appeal. “It follows that it is not the logician’s particular job to declare
the truth of any statement, or the validity of any argument “(244). This is, pardon me, true. The
task of the logician is to set forth the standards that govern good argument, as he himself is
engaged in doing in Chapter 7 of Fallacies. And what we find there is I think a bit surprising.
Tindale alludes to Hamblin’s redundancy argument, the argument which says that “I
accept P” and “P is true” amount to the same; that to say “P is true” is nothing more or less than
to say “P.” I am not convinced by this argument (2000:279) but let it pass. My purpose here is to
point out that Hamblin never argues that we should not have the truth criterion available, nor that
that we should discard it. He argues that dialectical criteria (acceptance/acceptability) have a
certain priority over alethic and epistemic ones, which presupposes that they are around. I think
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then that Hamblin is much like me in having available for his theory of evaluation both
dialectical and alethic criteria but thinking that dialectical are more fundamental. In other words
where we disagree is about the way to handle The Integration Problem.

5 The acceptability criterion
Tindale says that I have no problem with an acceptability requirement per se. But that is
not entirely true. In (2000) I raised a number of issues (192 ff). My concerns there were framed
in term of acceptance; and Tindale (citing Govier) makes it clear that acceptance (which was
what Hamblin adopted) is not good enough.
First, what is acceptability? Tindale quotes Govier “A premise is acceptable when it is a
premise that the audience ought to take as cogent?” Is that what Tindale thinks? What is meant
here by “cogent”?
Second, as Derek Allen argued (1998), it can be quite as difficult to determine whether a
premise is acceptable as to determine whether it is true. So if one of the objections raised against
the TC is the difficulty of determining when it applies, then it is not clear that the acceptability
criterion is any easier.
Third, inconsistency is clearly thought to be a bad thing; and I suspect Tindale will
unpack inconsistency in the standard way: two beliefs are inconsistent if they cannot be true
together. Could he have written: two beliefs are inconsistent if they cannot be acceptable
together? Though P and not-P cannot both be true; if it is possible for P and not P to both be
acceptable then what becomes of consistency requirement that Tindale is clearly committed to. In
other words, will you be able to unpack crucial ideas used in argument evaluation, such as
assumption, presumption, plausibility, coherence in terms of acceptability?
Truth again. In characterizing my position at the end of his paper, Tindale says that for
me “the truth requirement is attached to the idea of evaluating arguments in and of themselves,
detached from the contexts in which they arise.” But I don’t think I am committed to any such
view of how to evaluate arguments. See for example how we analyze arguments (LSD, 2e 219229), including one case where we reject an argument for having a false premise (p. 228).
Tindale writes that my position “sees a premise’s truth as a property inherent in it”(8); but in fact
I see the truth of a premise as a function of its relationship to the world. The statement “There are
nine planets” is true not inherently but because as a matter of fact there are nine. Part of this fit is
coherence with other beliefs but another part, as but as James himself recognized, was that it
accords with the facts.
In my theory then there is a need for reference to argument, audience and the world
beyond them. It sometimes seems too me that Tindale has room for the argument and the
audience. I get this from what he says at the end of his paper:
Perhaps a statement has a value independent of its use in an argument, what we might
choose to call its truth-value. But for argumentative purposes this is irrelevant! Its value
here arises in relation to an argument intended for a specific audience.
How, I have to ask, would a statement lose its truth-value just because it becomes part of
the argument?

5

R.H. Johnsons’ commentary on C.W. Tindale’s “The Truth About Orangutans: Defending Acceptability”

It seems to me that when we evaluate we are playing off various aspects of the argument
works: how well it fits with the audience’s belief, and how well it fits with what we know or
think about the world. For me, there are three vectors in the process of argument evaluation:
from the premises to the conclusion; from the premises to the world; and from the premises to
the audience. For Tindale, it seems, that there are just two: the audience and the argument. The
world, it seems, has disappeared.

Conclusion
I may be confused; and I would certainly admit that I have not presented a well-worked
out theory of truth to support my call for TC. Maybe I need one. If I do, my current favourite
would be Goldman’s theory of truth in Knowledge in a Social World (1999): “To summarize I
believe that the various rivals of the correspondence theory are subject to crippling objections, so
that the correspondence theory, while requiring further metaphysical clarification, is still the best
bet” (88).
I know that am perplexed, because while Tindale seems to be arguing against the truth
criterion, he continues to refer to it and to make use of it. If the AC is perfectly adequate, why
this continued use of TC? And is the criterion he is defending for premise adequacy:
acceptability or acceptance?
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